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LIABILITY OF SUPPLIERS 
OF NATURAL RAW MATERIALS 
AND THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
PRODUCTS LLABILITY-A FIRST STEP 
TOWARD SOUND PUBLIC POLICY 
M. Stuart Madden* 
From its inception, the law governing liability for damage or inju- 
ries caused by defective products has pertained to potential liability 
for products that have been processed, finished, or fabricated. 
Naturally occurring raw materials, for the most part, have been 
considered beyond doctrinal concern, largely because characterizing 
a merchantable m w  material, such as copper or pigiron, as defective 
is conceptually difficult. Nevertheless, certain doctrines that devel- 
oped for the application of products liability to other products have 
gained sporadic application to naturally occurring raw materials, 
including the sophisticated purchaser defense, the bulk supplier 
defense, and the ingredient supplier defense. Madden argues that 
the proliferation of discrete defenses only has spawned confusion, 
and has not altered the decisional history demonstrating that 
liability will not be imposed for sale of bulk qwntities of naturally 
occurring raw materials. Consequently, he concludes that the new 
Restatement should provide a comment stating explicitly that 
liability should not attach to such sellers absent a showing of a 
defect in the raw material itself that poses an unreasonable risk of 
personal physical injury. 
Tentative DraR  umber 2 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
Products Liability,' together with Tentative DraR Number 3,2 
address a very important practical issue: the duty in tort law of 
* James D. Hopkins Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law; B.A. 1971, 
University of Pennsylvania; M.A. 1972, London School of Economics and Political 
Science; J.D. 1976, Georgetown University Law Center. Gratitude is extended to 
Kimberly Weston and Matthew Ross for their valuable research assistance and to the 
American Tort Reform Association for its support of this research. 
1. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (Tentative Draft No. 2, 
1995) [hereinafter Tentative Draft No. 21. 
2. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (Tentative Draft No. 3, 
1996) [hereinafter Tentative Draft No. 31. 
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suppliers of raw materials3 that occur in nature. The Reporters 
of the proposed Restatement have done a commendable job, but 
unresolved characterization and warning issues concerning 
natural raw materials retain their ambiguity in the current 
In addition, crucial public policy issues surrounding the 
liability issue demand more precision. 
The commentary to the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 
402A5 intimates that merchantable, naturally occurring raw 
materials such as copper, silver, and lead generally should not 
be considered defe~tive,~ and that sellers of such raw materials 
ordinarily should be conferred de jure immunity.7 To reach this 
3. In its broad sense, the term 'raw material" is used to describe material sold in 
bulk that is transformed in the course of the production of the completed product. 
Under this definition, both naturally occurring and synthetic or processed substances, 
ranging from rolled copper to Teflon*, may be categorized as "raw materials." 
4. The principal characterization issues are the determination ofwhether natural- 
ly occumng raw materials are "productsn within the meaning of products liability or 
whether a natural substance becomes a product only upon some measure of processing; 
and whether the incorporation of a raw material into another product so changes its 
original properties that the raw material seller is relieved of potential liability. 
The pertinent warning or informational issues are whether there exists a duty to 
warn of the natural propensities of substances that have been in use since time 
immemorial; and, if such warnings are required, to whom are they owed. As to the 
latter point, the issue often is one of evaluating whether a seller of a raw material may 
fairly rely upon a sophisticated purchaser to convey any warning to those who will come 
into contact with the material. 
5. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 8 402A (1965). Section 40% states, in 
pertinent part: "(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably 
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical 
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property . . . ." Id. 
6. See id. cmt. p ("[Tlhe manufacturer of pigiron, which is capable of a wide 
variety of uses, is not so likely to be held to strict liability when it turns out to be 
unsuitable for the child's tricycle into which it is finally made by a remote buyer."); cf. 
Tentative Draft No. 3, supra note 2,910 cmt. c. Comment c states, in pertinent part: 
A basic raw material such as sand, gravel, or kerosine cannot be defectively 
designed. If there is an inappropriate decision in the use of such materials, the 
failing is not attributable to the supplier of the raw materials, but rather to the 
fabricator that put them to use. . . . The same considerations apply to failure-to- 
warn claims against sellers of raw materials. 
Id. 
7. The author employs the phrase de jure immunity in its conventional sense, 
which is to say that immunity is conferred as a matter of definition or as a matter of 
law. See, e.g., Plummer v. Abbott Lab., 568 F. Supp. 920 (D.R.I. 1983). In Plummer, a 
DES case, the trial court applied a de jure approach to granting defendant's motion for 
summary judgment on the plaintiffs' claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress 
based on heightened concern for the medical risks imposed upon their daughters. See 
id. a t  922-24. In the court's words: 
As to each of the claims at  bar, either a mother-anddaughter relationship exists, 
or the plaintiff herself is held out to be the injured party. Yet, having in mind the 
lack of physical symptomatology on the part of the mother in each instance, and 
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result, some courts have said that material not reduced to 
consumable form is not a product within the meaning of prod- 
ucts liability law.$ Moreover, most naturally occurring raw 
materials are integrated into altogether different products 
before being sold to the consuming public. The implications of 
this process of integration into a new form were summarized by 
one respected author, who stated that once "the component part 
is no longer distinguishable or capable of being identified on its 
own, it loses its status as a product."g 
Such a finding-that the material is not a product within the 
contemplation of products liability law, that a "no duty"1° rather 
than a "limited duty"" rule should apply-has a sound public 
as to the daughters in many instances, such a facile conclusion may indeed beg 
the question: there may well be, de jure, no injured party. If Rhode Island hews 
to the corporal manifestation rule, these cases may well illustrate a modem 
example of the damnum absque injuria maxim. 
Id. at  923-24. 
As used elsewhere in this Article, the phrase "de facto immunity" is immunity that 
the courts have applied on a case-by-case basis, often through the application of defenses 
known as the bulk supplier defense, the ingredient supplier defense, and the sophistica- 
ted purchaser defense. As summarized by the Reporters, 'Some courts invoke special 
doctrines such as the 'raw material supplier defense' or the 'bulk saleslsophisticated pur- 
chaser rule' to negate liability." Tentative Draft No. 3, supra note 2, 5 10 cmt. a, a t  28. 
8. See, e.g., Wyrulec Co. v. Schutt, 866 P.2d 756, 760 (Wyo. 1993) (holding strict 
liability doctrine inapplicable in a suit brought against an electrical utility for injuries 
sustained when an employee touched transmission wires because electricity is not "a 
product"); cf. Kennedy v. Vacation Intemationale, La., 841 F. Supp. 986,989 (D. Haw. 
1994) (holding that tile used in resort's flooring was not a."productn under Hawaii law 
because it became a building fmture when laid). 
9. Charles E. Cantu, The Illusive Meaning of the !l'erm "Productn Under Section 
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 44 OKLA. L. REV. 635,656 (1994). 
10. A 'no duty" rule is in essence a policy conclusion that the relationship between 
either the plaintiff and the defendant, or the plaintiffs harm and the defendant's causal 
contribution to that harm, does not warrant shifting the burden of plaintiffs loss to the 
defendant. Sometimes this "no duty" conclusion is reached on the basis that plaintiffs 
harm is so remote from defendant's conduct as to preclude liability. See, e.g., Palsgraf 
v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 100-01 (N.Y. 1928) (denying recovery where defen- 
dant's conduct was not a wrong in its relation to plaintiff and thus did not involve an 
invasion of a legally protected interest). In other settings, a "no duty" rule is grounded 
in the perception that the plaintiff and defendant's relationship is so remote that any 
other course would be unwieldy, arbitrary, or both, from the perspective of judicial 
administration. See, e.g., Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 309 
(1927) (stating that "a tort to the person or property of one man does not make the 
tortfeasor liable to another merely because the injured person was under a contract 
with that other, unknown to the doer of the wrong"). 
11. A "limited duty" rule, such as the "informed intermediary," "sophisticated 
purchaser," see infra note 13 and Part II.B, or "bulk supplier" rules, see infra notes 13, 
37-40 and accompanying text, presumes that defendant has a duty toward plaintiff, but 
that it is delegable to another upon the satisfaction of certain circumstances. In the 
context of the "informed intermediary," "sophisticated purchaser," or "bulk supplier" 
doctrines, the delegee of such duties is ordinarily the immediate vendee. 
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policy basis. Raw materials suppliers are generally distanced 
from subsequent design decisions and subsequent warnings 
decisions, as well as remote from knowledge of the end use of 
the material in a finished product.12 Courts also have appreciat- 
ed that naturally occurring raw materials are ordinarily sold in 
bulk,13 and further have understood that such raw materials 
are conventionally "redesigned" in the course of creating the 
final manufactured product, and thus lose their essential 
characteristics. For example, redesigned aluminum, such as an 
aluminum alloy, is no longer raw aluminum.14 Additionally, 
12. Some courts have reached the same result by observing that the raw material 
had not been reduced to consumable fonn. See Cantu, supra note 9, at 653 (listing 
jurisdictions that have found electricity not to be a "product" within the meaning of 
products liability, based in part upon the conclusion that i t  is a "commodity which can 
not be packaged, labeled, and sold and, therefore, is not a fungible good"); cf: Houston 
Lighting & Power Co. v. Reynolds, 765 S.W.2d 784, 785 (Tex. 1988) (holding that 
although electricity is a "product," strict liability was precluded because a t  the time of 
the accident, the electricity was not in the condition in which it could be sold). 
13. As recited by the Reporters: 
Some courts invoke special doctrines such as the "raw material supplier defense" 
or the "bulk sales/sophisticated purchaser rule" to negate liability. These formula- 
tions recognize that component sellers who do not participate in the design of the 
integrated product should not be liable merely because the components become 
physically part of other products that are dangerously defective. 
Tentative Draft No. 3, supra note 2, 8 10 cmt. a, a t  28. 
The "bulk supplier" defense posits that the seller of products in bulk ordinarily has 
warning duties that extend only to its immediate vendee. See Werckenthein v. Bucher 
Petrochemical Co.. 618 N.E.2d 902. 908 (Ill. ADD. Ct. 1993) (holdina that defendant 
- - . . - 
manufacturers had adequately warned of product's dangers and were not obligated to 
warn employees of an employer's particular use of the product). Under the "sophisticated 
purchaser" or "sophisticated usef defense, "if the danger related to the particular 
product is clearly known to the purchaserlemployer, then there will be no obligation to 
warn placed upon the supplier. Instead, it becomes the employer's responsibility to guard 
against the known danger . . . ." O'Neal v. Celanese Corp., 10 F.3d 249, 251 (4th Cir. 
1993) (quoting Kennedy v. Mobay Corp., 579 A.2d 1191,1196 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990)). 
See also Charles E. Erway, 111, The Ingredient Supplier Defense, 16 J .  PROD. & TOXICS 
LIAB. 269, 285-86 (1994) (defining "sophisticated purchaser" defense as relieving the 
supplier of a hazardous product or substance of liability when the product or substance 
is purchased by an industrial user and the supplier has reasonable grounds to believe 
that the user is already aware of the hazards); discussion infra Parts 1I.A & B. 
14. Characterizing a naturally occurring raw material as defectively designed is 
nonsensical. In most instances such a basic raw material is not susceptible to change, 
i.e., copper is a defined element with immutable characteristics and cannot in any 
sensible way be "redesigned." Therefore, as this Article notes, to impose warnings 
obligations upon the sellers of basic raw materials makes little sense, either from a 
practical or prudential standpoint. Cf: Brown v. Superior Ct., 751 P.2d 470, 478 (Cal. 
1988) ("While [defective equipment1 might be 'redesigned' by the addition of safety 
devices, there is no possibility for an alternative design for a drug like DES, which is 
a scientific constant compounded in accordance with a required formula."). 
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decisional and scholarly support exists for the common sense 
conclusion that there are no "design alternatives" to raw mate- 
rials.15 As copper is copper, there can be no liability for defec- 
tive design of it. Furthermore, the duty to warn is best placed 
on those who alter the raw material and shape i t  into the 
resulting product. They know best how to make the warnings 
and are able to assure that those who need to be warned see 
the warnings, read them, and understand them. 
The Reporters' treatment of naturally occurring raw materials 
shows substantial fidelity to more than thirty years of decision- 
al law.16 The Reporters conclude, as have the decisions upon 
which they rely, that a raw material is not defective-upon 
either a design or a warning rationale-simply through its 
inclusion in an end-use product that causes injury or harm.17 
It is essential that the new Restatement be as explicit as 
possible to retain this basic fabric of law. A suggestion for 
15. See, e.g., Singleton v. Manitowoc Co., Inc., No. 90-1714, 1991 WL 64953, at **2 
(4th Cir. Apr. 29, 1991) ("[A] defect is a condition of a product by which i t  does not 
conform to recognized standards in the design of the product, recognized standards 
imposed by society, or consumer expectations."); Tentative Draft No. 3, supra note 2, 
# 10 cmt. c ("A basic raw material such as sand, gravel, or kerosine cannot be defec- 
tively designed."). 
Manufacturing defects play no essential role in the analysis of potential products 
liability for naturally occurring raw materials. A manufacturing defect is defined as "a 
physical departure from a product's intended design that  poses risks of harm to persons 
or property." Tentative DraR No. 2, supra note 1, fj 1 cmt. a, a t  1. As there is no 
intended design of a raw material, there can be no departure from it. 
16. See Tentative Draft No. 3, supra note 2, fj 10 reporters' note cmt. b. The 
reporters' note states: 
The issue is whether the seller of a component or raw material has a duty to 
inform itself about specific applications . . . and a further duty to determine 
whether the buyer who will integrate it into another product is knowledgeable as 
to the dangers attendant to that specific application. The Reporters have found 
no cases imposing such an onerous duty. 
Id. at 40. 
17. See Tentative Draft No. 3, supra note 2,Q 11 cmt. a. The comment states tha t  
when a product has a manufacturing defect. . . it must also be established that, 
had there been no defect, the harm to the plaintiff would have been avoided or 
diminished. Similarly, if a product was defectively designed or was defective 
because of inadequate instructions or warnings, . . . it must be established that, 
had the product been properly designed or had the product been accompanied by 
reasonable instructions or warnings, the harm to the plaintiff would have been 
avoided or diminished. Moreover, the harm to the plaintiff must be of the sort that  
was reasonably to be expected given the nature of the defect. 
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improving the language of the Restatement is offered in the 
Conclusion. This Article will show why a rationale for excluding 
naturally occurring raw materials from potential products 
liability is consistent with the doctrine's original purposes, as 
well as the goals of deterrence, fairness, and judicial efficiency. 
I. EARLY PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW-BEFORE 
THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
Whether the issue is one of design or warnings, a predicate 
to  the application of products liability doctrine has always been 
that the material implicated in plaintiffs suit be a "product."18 
Yet it does not follow that anything of physical mass that is 
sold is potentially subject to a products liability claim for 
personal injury, property damage, or economic loss accompanied 
by other damages compensable in tort.lg Two decades before the 
1965 publication of the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 
402A, California Supreme Court Justice Roger Traynor made 
clear that the basis for strict liability applied to products whose 
marketing and use is routinely the result of production by 
"valuable [trade] secrets," "sealed package[s] ," "advertising," 
"marketing devices such as trade-marks," and a general con- 
sumer inability "to investigate for himself the soundness of 
[the] product."20 
18. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1962) 
(stating that  strict liability's purpose is "to insure that the costs of injuries resulting 
from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the 
market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves"). 
19. Cf Public Serv. Ind., Inc. v. Nichols, 494 N.E.2d 349, 355 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) 
(applying strict liability where electricity "had been reduced to consumption level and 
passed through customer metersn). But cf Houston Lighting & Power Co. v. Reynolds, 
765 S.W.2d 784, 785 (Tex. 1988) (holding a power company was not subject to strict 
liability for injuries caused by contact with high-voltage power lines because the 
electricity, while considered a "product," did not reach the consumer without substantial 
change in the condition in which it was sold); Wyrulec Co. v. Schutt, 866 P.2d 756, 761 
(Wyo. 1993) (holding that an electrical utility company could not be strictly liable where 
a roofer was injured after touching electrical wires because "electricity is a service and 
not a productn). 
In contrast, i t  generally has been held that in the law of trespass and nuisance, no 
such threshold showing of "consumable formn applies. See generally GERALD W. BOSTON 
& M. STUART -DEN, LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL ND TOXIC TORTS: CASES, MATERIALS 
AND PROBLEMS 28-37 (1994). 
20. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 443 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, 
J., concurring). Justice Traynor saw the need for strict products liability for 
mismanufactured products--products that did not conform to the manufacturer's own 
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Two decades later, Justice Traynor commanded a majority of 
the California Supreme Court for'his modern expression of a 
rule of strict liability for the sale of defective products that 
injure a user. In Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.," the 
California Supreme Court stated: 
A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he 
places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without 
inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes 
injury to a human being. 
. . . To establish the manufacturer's liability it was suffi- 
cient that plaintiff proved that he was injured while using 
the Shopsmith in a way it was intended to be used as a 
result of a defect in design and manufacture of which plain- 
tiff was not aware that made the Shopsmith unsafe for its 
intended use." 
As the New York Court of Appeals in MacPherson v. Buick 
Motor CO.'~ had done many years earlier, the Greenman court 
supported its new doctrine with authority derived from cases 
involving merchantability and fitness for consumption or 
intimate bodily application, such as food, cosmetics, or toilet- 
r i e ~ . ' ~  Read together, the court found that the earlier holdings 
shared common characteristics: "Recognized first in the case of 
unwholesome food products, such liability has now been extend- 
ed to a variety of other products that create as great or greater 
hazards if defective.*'= As examples, the court referenced 
decisions involving soda bottles, vaccines, insect spray, a 
surgical pin, a skirt, an automobile, an automobile tire, a home 
specifications, such as a reusable soda bottle. Justice Traynor observed, "As handicrafts 
have been replaced by mass production . . . the close relationship between the producer 
and consumer of a product has been altered." Id. Thus, the liability envisioned by 
Justice Traynor, the eventual author of Greenman, was for mass-produced items, i.e., 
chattels or personal property. Neither the decision's rationale, nor its focus, were 
directed at mass-produced naturally occurring raw materials. 
21. 377 P.2d 897 (1962). 
22. Id. at 900-01. 
23. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). 
24. See Greenman, 377 P.2d at 899-901. 
25. Id. at 900. 
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permanent, hair dye, and an airplane.26 Justice Traynor's em- 
phasis on tire, auto, clothing, and toiletry cases to inaugurate 
a new doctrine of strict products liability shows that the 
products liability obligation was not intended to reach materials 
that were sold without substantial finishing or processing. 
11. THE TREATMENT OF NATURALLY OCCURRING RAW 
MATERIALS UNDER THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
Two years after Greenman, the American Law Institute (the 
ALI) published the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Under section 
402A, the decisional law has continued to lend substantial sup- 
port to the conclusion that the purpose of products liability 
doctrine is to protect consumers from unreasonable risks of 
harm caused by manufactured or processed  product^.^' Modern 
decisions continue to send the same message: the principal 
target of products liability law is "item[sln on a "product line,"28 
or   chattel[^],"^^ which are defined in one dictionary as "move- 
able item[s] of personal property."30 > 
26. See id. a t  900-01 (citing Brown v. Chapman, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962) (hula 
skirt); Bowles v. Zimmer Mfg. Co., 277 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1960) (surgical pin); B.F. 
Goodrich Co. v. Hammond, 269 F.2d 501 (10th Cir. 1959) (automobile tire); Thompson 
v. Reedman, 199 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Pa. 1961) (automobile); McQuaide v. Bridgeport 
Brass Co., 190 F. Supp. 252 (D. Conn. 1960) (insect spray); Hinton v. Republic Aviation 
Corp., 180 F. Supp. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (airplane); Vallis v. Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 
11 Cal. Rptr. 823 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961) (soda bottle); Gottsdanker v. Cutter Lab., 6 Cal. 
Rptr. 320 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (vaccine); Graham v. Bottenfield's, Inc., 269 P.2d 413 
(Kan. 1954) (hair dye); Markovich v. McKesson & Robbi ,  Inc., 149 N.E.2d 181 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 1958) (home permanent)). 
27. See 1 M. STUART MADDEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY Q 6.1, at  192 & n.12 (2d ed. 
1988) (listing decisions in which 33 jurisdictions have adopted strict liability for defective 
products). 
28. Soule v. General Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 304 (Cal. 1994) (involving motor 
vehicle crashworthiness). 
29. Armstrong v. Cione, 738 P.2d 79.82 (Haw. 1987) (finding insufficient plaintifPs 
strict liability claim for injury from a plate glass shower door in apartment because door 
was part of the premises rather than a product). As the court explained: 
[Tlhe public interest in human life and safety requires the maximum possible 
protection that the law can muster against [defective products] . . . and that the 
burden of accidental injuries caused by defective chattels should be placed upon 
those in the chain of distribution as a cost of doing business and as [a deterrent]. 
Id. a t  82 (first alteration in original) (quoting Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp., 470 
P.2d 240. 243 (Haw. 1970)). 
30. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 242 (2d College ed. 1980). In the regulated 
areas, such as medical devices, federal regulations impose requirements upon the 
Heinonline - -  30 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 288 1996-1997 
WINTER AND SPRING 19971 Liability of Raw Materials Suppliers 289 
The discussion that follows describes the two principles that 
commonly control the treatment of naturally occurring raw 
materials. First, when there is a change in the material over 
which the supplier has neither knowledge nor control, there is 
no liability for the ~upplier.~' Second, there is de jure or de facto 
immunitg2 for sellers of such raw materials, pursuant to  the 
alternative conclusions that either such materials are defini- 
tionally excluded from potential liability or, on the facts of the 
case, doctrines such as the sophisticated purchaser defense or 
the bulk supplier defense preclude liability. 
A. Uncontrolled Change in Products Results in No Duty 
For design or warnings liability alike, the Restatement (Sec- 
ond) of Torts section 402A(l)(b) requires that a product sold 
"must be 'expected to and does reach the user or consumer 
without substantial change in the condition in which it is 
sold.' "33 The "without substantial change" predicate to section 
402A is explained in comment p: 
Thus far the decisions applying the rule stated have not 
gone beyond products which are sold in the condition, or in 
substantially the same condition, in which they are expected 
to reach the hands of the ultimate user or consumer. In the 
absence of decisions providing a clue to  the rules which are 
likely to develop, the Institute has refrained from taking any 
position as to the possible liability of the seller where the 
product is expected to, and does, undergo further processing 
"6nished device." Mendes v. Medtronic, Inc., 18 F.3d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 1994) (citing 21 
C.F.R. 5 820.20(a) (1996)). Cf. SchafFer v. AO. Smith Harvestore Prods., Inc., 74 F.3d 
722, 729 (6th Cir. 1996) ("[Tlhere is no duty to warn extending to the speculative 
anticipation of how manufactured components, not in and of themselves dangerous or 
defective, can become potentially dangerous dependent upon their integration into a unit 
designed and assembled by another." (citation omitted)). If there is no liability for the 
manufacturer of the component part in the latter setting, it follows a fortiori that there 
should be no liability for the seller of the naturally occurring raw material, the 
relationship of which to the finished product is a t  an even greater remove. 
31. See infra notes 3 3 4 0  and accompanying text. 
32. See supra note 7; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 416, 425 (6th ed. 1990) 
(defining de jure as "[olf right" and "as a matter of right," and de facto as "[iln fact, in 
deed, actually"). 
33. States S.S. Co. v. Stone Manganese Marine, Ltd., 371 F. Supp. 500,505 (D.N.J. 
1973) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 8 402A (1965)). 
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or other substantial change after it leaves his hands and 
before i t  reaches those of the ultimate user or consumer.34 
This comment is instructive: In effect, the ALI took a position 
with respect to raw materials such as pigiron. The comment 
noted that in the case of a raw material "capable of a wide 
variety of uses," responsibility shifts. If the "ultimate user" 
manufactures a child's tricycle with the pigiron, and the pigiron 
is unsuitable for that purpose, liability is imposed on the party 
that manufactured the tricycle, not. on the supplier of the 
p i g i r ~ n . ~ ~  The comment also clearly stated that when material 
sold in bulk is itself defective, and that defect causes a harm, 
liability indeed may be imposed on the supplier.36 
Thus comment p proposes that no liability should attach to the 
seller of raw materials having multiple end uses, the selection 
of which is beyond the seller's control. In harmony with this is 
the "no duty" rule adopted by courts considering claims involving 
bulk sales of substances incapable of being labeled at  the time 
of their unfinished and initial introduction into commerce. For 
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 402A cmt. p (1965). The comment provides 
further: 
I t  seems reasonably clear that the mere fact that the product is to undergo 
processing, or other substantial change, will not in all cases relieve the seller of 
liability under the rule stated in this Section. If, for example, raw coffee beans are 
sold to a buyer who roasts and packs them for sale to the ultimate consumer, i t  
cannot be supposed that the seller will be relieved of all liability when the raw 
beans are contaminated with arsenic, or some other poison. . . . On the other hand, 
the manufacturer of pigiron, which is capable of a wide variety of uses, is not so 
likely to be held to strict liability when it  turns out to be unsuitable for the child's 
tricycle into which it is finally made by a remote buyer. The question is essentially 
one of whether the responsibility for discovery and prevention of the dangerous 
defect is shifted to the intermediate party who is to make the changes. No doubt 
there will be some situations, and some defects, as to which the responsibility will 
be shifted, and others in which it will not. The existing decisions as yet throw no 
light upon the questions, and the Institute therefore expresses neither approval 
nor disapproval of the seller's strict liability in such a case. 
Id. See generally Gene M .  Williams & Greg German, The Liability of Raw Material 
Manufacturers: It's Time To Restate the Restatement, 43 FED% INS. & CORP. COUNS. Q. 
23, 24-25 (1992). 
35. See, e.g., Pennwalt Corp. v. Superior Ct., 218 Cal. Rptr. 675,677 (Ct. App. 1985) 
(finding bulk chemical manufacturer not liable to ultimate consumer injured in explosion 
caused by careless compounding of chemicals that had been repackaged, relabeled and 
resold by distributor and retailer over which manufacturer had no control); Jones v. 
Hittle Sew., Inc., 549 P.2d 1383, 1394 (Kan. 1976) (holding that a manufacturer who 
sells its product to a trained and capable distributor who is familiar with the product 
owes no duty to warn the ultimate consumer). 
36. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS Q 402A cmt. p (1965). 
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example, in Groll v. Shell Oil C O . , ~ ~  a suit brought against the 
bulk supplier of the chemical BT-67, which had been incorporat- 
ed into store and lantern fuel, the plaintiff was burned while 
trying to light a fire. Finding no liability for failure to warn, the 
court concluded that a bulk supplier's duty to warn simply does 
not arise absent "tangible items that could be labeled, or sent 
into the chain of commerce with the manufacturer's instruc- 
t i o n ~ . ~ ~ *  
Accordingly, this practical proposition that a supplier should 
not be responsible for change to a product outside of its control 
supports the general approach in the Restatement (Se~ond).~' 
Naturally occurring raw materials are sold in bulk to intermedi- 
ary fabricators or processors; they are not "sold in the condition, 
or substantially the same condition, in which it  is expected to 
reach the ultimate user or consumer."40 
B. De Jure and De Facto Immunity 
In the thirty years following publication of section 402A, 
judicial decisions have followed two paths toward excluding raw 
materials sellers from design or warnings liability--de jure 
immunity or de facto imm~ni ty .~ '  De jure immunity is granted 
by decisions that find, expressly or implicitly, that certain 
transactions in naturally occurring raw materials are not the 
products that the authors of the Restatement (Second) envisioned 
as properly subject to strict liability.42 
37. 196 Cal. Rptr. 52 (Ct. App. 1983). 
38. Id. a t  55. See also Werckenthein v. Bucher Petrochemical Co., 618 N.E.2d 902, 
90849 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (holding that where suppliers of chemicals in bulk had 
warned of consequences of prolonged exposure, and a chemist failed to follow the 
industry practice for testing such a chemical, manufacturer does not breach duty to warn 
by failing to provide a specific precaution against chemist's practice of sniffing directly 
from the container); House v. Armour of Am., Inc., 886 P.2d 542, 554 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994) ("A bulk supplier of raw materials which are not themselves inherently dangerous 
has no duty to warn ultimate users of the manufactured product."), afd, 1996 WL 
714611 (Utah, Dec. 13, 1996); cf. Jones, 549 P.2d at  1393 (noting that "[a] bulk supplier 
. . . is in an entirely different position from one who sells packaged commodities or who 
deals directly with the consumer"). 
39. See Leon v. Caterpillar Indus., Inc., 69 E3d 1326,1338 (7th Cir. 1995) (affirm- 
ing jury verdict for manufacturer in a forklift operator's strict liability action against 
manufacturer where manufacturer interposed the defense that retailer's faulty instal- 
lation of a deadman's switch was the proximate cause of the accident). 
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS Q 402A cmt. d (1965). 
41. See supra notes 7, 32 and accompanying text. 
42. Cf. Edward M. Mansfield, Reflections on Current Limits on Component andRaw 
Material Supplier Liability and the Proposed Third Restatement, 84 KY. L.J. 221, 231 
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De facto immunity is granted by decisions that state that a 
raw material supplier in a particular case had no duty to warn 
because either the buyer was a sophisticated or a professional 
user and did not need to  be warned;43 or the buyer was in a 
superior position to know of the end use to which the product 
would be devoted and was in a better position than the raw 
material supplier to identify what warnings were needed and 
to make them.44 Distinguishable in degree from both the bulk 
supplier and the component supplier defenses, the raw material 
supplier defense (sometimes aptly termed the ingredient suppli- 
er defense)45 posits that the manufacturer's "end" product no 
longer is the "material" that the raw material or ingredient 
supplier originally sold.46 This distinction turns upon the suppli- 
er's position not only that i t  has no control over packaging of the 
end product (a limitation that is common with bulk suppliers), 
but also that it has no control over the form or composition of 
the end product itself. As such, the raw material or ingredient 
supplier participates neither in the risk creation nor in the risk 
(1995-96) ("A raw material by definition is of value to society precisely because it can 
be adapted to a wide variety of applications. . . . That does not mean that they are 'safe' 
in all applications; no material is."). See generally Williams-& German, supra note 34, 
a t  25 n.8 (arguing that the precondition in section 402A(l)(a) that the " 'seller' engage 
'in the business of selling such a product' " should operate to "exclude bulk suppliers 
from liability because they do not sell finished 'products' "1. 
43. See, e.g., Kalinowski v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 851 F. Supp. 149 (E.D. 
Pa. 1994). In discussing the sophisticated user doctrine, the court commented that 
the "Sophisticated User'' defense does not absolve the bulk supplier of the duty to 
warn ultimate users. Rather, applying 8 388 [comment nl of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts simply permits the court to find that such supplier discharged 
its duty by reasonably relying upon the intermediary to convey appropriate 
warnings to the ultimate users. 
Id. a t  157. 
44. See Smith v. Walter C. Best, Inc., 927 F.2d 736,74142 (3rd Cir. 1990) ( a h -  
ing the district court's grant of summary judgment in a silicosis case based upon the 
sophisticated purchaser defense); see also Kenneth M. Willner, Note, Failures to Warn 
and the Sophisticated User Defense, 74 VA. L. REV. 579,589 (1988) (noting that under 
the sophisticated user defense "sellers act reasonably if they do not warn intermediate 
purchasers of dangers of which the intermediate purchasers are already knowledgeable"). 
45. See Erway, supra note 13, a t  269 ("[Aln ingredient supplier provides a raw 
material or substance, such as a potentially hazardous chemical, to manufacturing 
companies that create their own products."). 
46. See id. In raising this defense the ingredient or raw material seller argues that 
"the manufacturer's end product, whatever i t  may be, is not the same 'product' as what 
the ingredient supplier sold."Id. After all, any substance can be hazardous. As the 16th- 
century physician Paracelsus stated: "'What is i t  that is not poison? All things are 
poison and none without poison. Only the dose determines that a thing is not poison.' " 
Erway, supra note 13, at 273 (citation omitted). 
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reduction, if any, of the finished product. As a practical matter, 
the buyer of the raw materials should make the warnings to the 
end user because it is in the best position to do it. One simply 
cannot put warning tags on bulk pigiron, copper, steel, or lead. 
The rationale unifylng these theories is that knowledgeable 
purchasers are "in a far better position to communicate an 
effective warning to the ultimate user."47 The rule has been 
applied in a variety of situations involving eventual finished 
products such as capacitors in dataphones4' made from bulk 
materials such as silica.49 
47. Sara Lee Corp. v. Homasote Co., 719 F. Supp. 417,422 (D. Md. 1989) (finding 
that a supplier of polystyrene beads to a manufacturer of board insulation was in the 
best position to warn user). 
Between the ingredient supplier and the downstream formulator, the supportable 
conclusion is that the downstream formulator, with its superior knowledge of the 
product's eventual use, is responsible for ultimate design, formulation, packaging, risk 
information, and marketing. See, e.g., George v. Parke-Davis, 733 P.2d 507, 515-16 
(Wash. 1987) (finding no liability in an indemnification action brought by a phar- 
maceutical company against the supplier of the active ingredient diethylstilbestrol 
(DES)). Finding no liability for the ingredient supplier, the court explained: 
DES is not inherently harmful, and still is prescribed today for ailments not 
associated with pregnant women. Thus, it is the way in which DES is used, and 
not DES per se, which is harmful. Furthermore, the [FDA] requires the tablet 
manufacturers and not the bulk manufacturers, to account for and warn of a drug's 
properties. It would therefore be anomalous to require the raw [ingredient] 
manufacturer to conduct separate tests to determine the adverse effects of the drug 
when by federal statute, the tablet manufacturer bears this responsibility. 
Id. at  515 (citation omitted). Shell Oil Co. v. Harrison, 425 So. 2d 67 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1982), involved a suit brought against the manufacturer of the chemical DBCP, which 
., was sold to a formulator who used it as an inmedient of a soil fumi~ant claimed to have 
injured the ultimate users of the fumigants. gee id. at  68-69. Rejecting the proposition 
that Shell had a nondelegable duty to warn ultimate users of the hazards of its products 
that were ingredients iidifferent products made by other companies, the couit stated 
that "labeling and packaging requirements necessarily differ depending upon the 
particular [end product] formulation and, thus, place the responsibility on the formulator 
for providing adequate warning to the public . . . ."Id. a t  70. White v. Weiner, 562 k 2 d  
378 (Pa. Super. Ct. 19891, affd, 583 A.2d 789 (Pa. 1991), involved a suit brought against 
Eli Lilly & Co., a bulk supplier of pharmaceutical chemicals, for failure to provide 
warnings on the chemical compound protarnine sulfate. The chemical compound was 
supplied in bulk to the Upjohn Co., who employed it  as an ingredient in a prescription 
drug. See id. at 379. The Pennsylvania court held that Eli Lilly had no tort duty to warn 
the end user, inasmuch as the end product producer was in a superior position to assess 
risks and decide upon the form and content of adequate labeling and instructions. See 
id. at  385-86. 
48. See Rivers v. AT & T Tech., Inc., 554 N.Y.S.2d 401, 403-05 (App. Div. 1990) 
(granting summary judgment in a products liability action for the supplier of 
dimethylformamide, or DMF, an ingredient in dataphone capacitors alleged to have 
caused or contributed to a woman's death). 
49. See, e.g., Smith v. Walter C. Best, Inc., 927 F.2d 736, 741-42 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(recognizing, under Ohio law, a sophisticated purchaser defense to purchaser's employ- 
ees' silicosis claims); Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213, 214-15 (4th Cir. 1985) (finding that 
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Accordingly, in many raw materials warnings cases, courts 
have held that a manufacturer either need not provide warnings 
to a buyer sophisticated in the risks of product use or in control 
of further processing, or may predicate such warnings as are 
provided upon reasonable expectations that the knowledgeable 
purchaser will act in ways consistent with his knowledge of 
product risks and handling.50 As the court stated in O'Neal v. 
Celanese C O ~ ~ . , ~ '  "if the danger . . . is clearly known to the 
purchaser/employer, then there will be no obligation to warn 
placed upon the supplier. . . . Stated another way, when the 
supplier has reason to believe that the purchaser . . . will 
recognize the danger associated with the product, no warnings 
are mandated."52 In Phillips v. A. P. Green Refractories Co., 53 
involving silica, a Pennsylvania Superior Court held that under 
Pennsylvania law the sophisticated user defense was available 
in strict products liability actions as well as those brought in 
negligen~e.~~ As applied to bulk sales, at  least one court has 
interpreted the sophisticated purchaser rule as obliging the bulk 
seller to confine its sales to such knowledgeable buyers. The 
Tenth Circuit in Mason v. Texaco, Inc. ,55 reversing a verdict for 
the plaintiff, stated that Kansas law: 
imposes upon the bulk seller the obligation to sell only to 
knowledgeable and responsible distributors. [It] does not 
impose a duty on the bulk seller to warn the ultimate 
consumer, and specifically does not impose a duty on the 
a supplier of silica had no duty to warn a purchaser's employees of dangers where the 
purchaser had extensive knowledge of the hazards of silica). 
50. See Prather v. Upjohn Co., 797 F.2d 923,924 (11th Cir. 1986) ("The evidence 
a t  trial showed that Upjohn sold its polyurethane foam exclusively to knowledgeable 
industrial consumers. The warnings Upjohn issued concerning the potential hazards of 
burning the foam were therefore designed accordingly."); Hegna v. E.I. DuPont de 
Nemours & Co., 825 F. Supp. 880,884 (D. Minn. 1993) ("It is now undisputed that Vitek 
[manufacturer of plaintiffs TMJ implants] knew both the properties of DuPont's PTFE 
and the scientific community's concerns regarding the use of PTFE-based materials to 
make implants such as the TMJ implant."). 
51. 10 F.3d 249 (4th Cir. 1993). 
52. Id. a t  251 (quoting Kennedy v. Mobay Corp., 579 k 2 d  1191,1196 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 1990)). 
53. 630 k 2 d  874 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993). 
54. See id. a t  882; see also Jackson v. Reliable Paste & Chem. Co., 483 N.E.2d 939, 
942-43 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (finding that a supplier of methanol, an ingredient of 
manufacturer's finished product, owed no duty to warn of methanol's dangers as the 
manufacturer knew of the chemical's explosive and flammable propensities). 
55. 862 F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1988). 
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bulk seller to police the adequacy of warnings given by the 
d i~ t r i bu to r .~~  
C. Prior Decisions Involving Naturally 
Occurring Raw Materials 
I.'Generally-As suggested, the decisions declining to confer 
"product" status upon basic naturally occurring raw materials 
have hewn consistently to the logical proposition that the raw 
material seller is so distanced from knowledge of the product's 
end uses or their attendant risks as to be unable to detect them, 
to avoid them, or to secure insurance to  spread the risks.57 
Representative of such decisions is one in which the basic raw 
material is in transit to the manufacturer in anticipation of 
product fabrication and an injury occurs during this intermedi- 
ate stage. In Spellmeyer v. Weyerhaeuser Gorp.:' plaintiff, a 
56. Id. at  246; see also Jones v. Hittle Sem., Inc., 549 P.2d 1383, 1394 (Kan. 1976) 
(holding that the bulk seller 'fulfills his duty to the ultimate consumer when he 
ascertains that the distributor to whom he sells is adequately trained, is familiar with 
the properties of the [propane] gas and safe methods of handling it, and is capable of 
passing on his knowledge to his customers"). 
57. See Tentative Draft No. 3, supra note 2, 9 10 cmt. c. Comment c provides: 
Raw materials. . . . The manufacturer of the integrated product has a significant 
comparative advantage regarding selection of materials to be used. Raw-materials 
sellers are accordingly not subject to liability for harm caused by defective design 
of the end-product. The same considerations apply to failure-to-warn claims against 
sellers of raw materials. To impose a duty to warn would require the seller to 
develop expertise regarding a multitude of different end-products and to investigate 
the actual use of raw materials by manufacturers over whom the supplier has no 
control. Courts uniformly refuse to impose such an onerous duty to warn. 
Id. 
A seller's efficient procurement of insurance turns upon its ability to anticipate risk 
with some level of reliability. See, e.g., 2 MADDEN, supra note 27, 9 25.1: 
In purchasing products liability insurance, the. . . seller seeks to exchange an 
uncertain risk, that of potential future actionable incidents involving its products, 
for a certain cost, that of annual premiums. . . . [Tlhe offering of insurance and 
the setting of premiums for liability insurance is based upon the carrier's actuarial 
projection ofwhat the insured's overall losses may be expected to be. . . . For a risk 
to be insurable it must, therefore, be "specified or capable of identification," and 
the duration of the risk must be fixed or determinable. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
58. 544 P.2d 107 (Wash. Ct. App. 1975). 
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longshoreman, brought a personal injury suit against a manu- 
facturer alleging that it failed to prepare wood pulp bales 
properly for shipping, so that plaintiff was injured when struck 
by bales that fell from a disintegrating eight-bale module.59 The 
court granted Weyerhaeuser summary judgment on the strict 
liability count: 
Imposition of strict liability is premised on the sound policy 
consideration that the manufacturer who markets his 
product for use and consumption by the general public is 
best able to bear the risk of loss resulting from a defective 
product. The thrust of Section 402A is, accordingly, to 
protect the "ultimate user or consumer" of the product. . . . 
In the instant case, Weyerhaeuser produced and packaged 
a raw material in an intermediate state, which was stored 
awaiting shipment to another processor. It did not harm or 
endanger any "ultimate user or consumer"; only expert 
loaders and expert carriers were required to deal with it. We 
therefore conclude that, because of the character of the 
"product" and the status of the plaintiff, the policy consider- 
ations which support imposition of strict liability in other 
contexts are too severely diluted here and dismissal was 
correct as to the strict liability theory.60 
Seller incapacity to anticipate, and therefore to affect, end-use 
risks provided the basis for defendant's judgment in Pennwalt 
Corp. v. Superior C ~ u r t . ~ '  That suit arose from injuries an 
eighteen-year-old plaintiff suffered while attempting to com- ' 
pound chemicals at home to create fireworks. The raw materials 
a t  issue included sodium chlorate, aluminum powder, and 
sulphur. Plaintiff brought suit against the manufacturer, 
distributor, and retailer of each The California 
appeals court held that the manufacturer of the chemicals 
should not be liable to plaintiff for the sale of a chemical that 
had been repackaged, relabeled, and distributed through a 
retailer over which the manufacturer had no control.63 The court 
explained: 
59. See id. at 108. 
60. Id. at 109-10. 
61. 218 Cal. Rptr. 675 (Ct. App. 1985). 
62. See id. at 675. 
63. See id. at 677. 
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Sodium Chlorate has many legitimate uses, some of which 
involve using it in conjunction with other chemicals. 
Pennwalt cannot be expected to anticipate every possible use 
and issue warnings of any potential danger involved in each 
such use. To hold otherwise would place an impossible 
burden on a bulk manufacturer which would be tantamount 
to imposing absolute liability for injury resulting from the 
use of a product 'not claimed to'be otherwise de fe~ t ive .~~  
Another California case, Walker v. Stauffer Chemical Corp., 65 
involved a plaintiff who was injured seriously by a drain cleaner 
explosion. The cleaner contained sulfuric acid. With respect to 
the supplier of the sulfuric acid, the court made this observation: 
We are referred to no California case, nor has independent 
research revealed any such, extending the strict liability of 
the manufacturer (seller) to the supplier of a substance to 
be used in compounding or formulating the product which 
eventually causes injury to an ultimate consumer. On the 
contrary this dearth of authority indicates to us a reluctance 
on the part of the bench and bar to consider such an exten- 
sion necessary or desirable for the protection of the ultimate 
~ o n s u m e r . ~ ~  
The Walker court explained that no public policy interest could 
be found for imposing liability upon a supplier of a non-defective 
ingredient: "The ultimate product . . . can in no way be consid- 
ered to be one and the same [as the] bulk sulfiric acid manufac- 
tured by Stauffer . . . ."67 The court further explained: 
w e  see no compelling reason for an extension [of strict 
liability] to a situation such as presented in the instant 
case. . . . We do not believe it realistically feasible or neces- 
sary to the protection of the public to require the manufac- 
turer and supplier of a standard chemical ingredient. . . not 
having control over the subsequent compounding, packaging 
or marketing of an item eventually causing injury to the 
64. Id. 
65. 96 Cal. Rptr. 803 (Ct. App. 1971). 
66.  Id. at 805-06. 
67. Id. at 805. 
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ultimate consumer, to bear the responsibility for that injury. 
The manufacturer (seller) of the product causing the injury 
is so situated as to afford the necessary protection.68 
2. Asbestos-The No Duty Rule in Action-Cases involving 
asbestos are not an exception to the "no duty" rule, but rather 
illustrate the application of the rule. In asbestos cases, the 
processor-not the mining company-is liable, because i t  is in 
the best position to warn of the hazards. For example, in Menna 
v. Johns-Manville Corp.,6' an asbestos personal injury suit, the 
district court concluded that even though asbestos was a product 
for purposes of strict liability, the person in the best position to 
warn of its h.azards-in this case the processor who formed the 
asbestos into its end use product-had the duty to warn of its 
hazards7' "Thus, as with the raw coffee beans in [Restatemerit 
(Second)] comment p, there is no justification for shifting 
responsibility for the harms of asbestos. from defendant pro- 
cessors to Owens-C~rning."~' 
Decisions like Menna may best be seen as consistent with the 
rule that suppliers of naturally occurring raw materials have no 
duty to warn processors of obvious dangers. If products such as 
asbestos always are considered dangerous, then the duty to 
warn is discharged best by the party who knows the end use and 
how best to  convey the warning to the end user. 
111. NATURALLY OCCURRING RAW MATERIALS 
UNDER THE RESTATEMENT ( HIRD) 
A. Generally 
Section 2 of the Restatement (Third) Tentative Draft No. 2 
establishes standards for determining product defectiveness. For 
purposes of determining the liability of a commercial seller or 
distributor for harm caused by defective products: 
68. Id. at 806. 
69. 585 F. Supp. 1178 (D.N.J. 1984). 
70. See id. at 1182. 
71. Id. at 1183. 
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(a) a product contains a manufacturing defect when the 
product departs from its intended' design even though all 
possible care was exercised in the preparation and mar- 
keting of the product; 
(b) a product is defective in design when the foreseeable 
risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced 
or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design 
by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the 
commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the 
alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe; 
(c) a product is defective because of inadequate instruc- 
tions or warnings when the foreseeable risks of harm posed 
by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the 
provision of reasonable instructions or warnings by the seller 
or other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial 
chain of distribution, and the.omission of the instructions or 
warnings renders the product not reasonably safe.72 
The language ofsection 2(b) itselfmilitates against its applica- 
tion to naturally occurring raw materials. As a practical matter, 
a raw material such as iron, aluminum, or copper has demon- 
strated its utility through generations of application in uses that 
require its specific physical propensities, such as weight, 
strength, conductivity, or otherwise. The entire concept of a 
"design" alternative would be distorted into unrecognizability if 
it were imagined that availability of an altered product, such as 
one that is no longer iron, or copper, or aluminum, was a 
feasible design alternative within the meaning of section 2(b). 
Concerning warnings and instructions, section 2(c)'s provision 
that warnings liability will arise where "the foreseeable risks of 
harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided 
by the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings by the 
seller"73 does not apply to the commercial and production 
processes of naturally occurring raw materials. The Walker 
court's commentary, noting the futility of imposing upon raw 
materials suppliers an obligation to inform themselves of all 
possible end product uses, and to provide warnings concerning 
potentially hazardous uses, is i l l~ s t r a t i ve .~~  
72. Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 1, 5 2. 
73. Id. 
74. See Walker, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 806. 
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Regarding sales to intermediaries, under the Restatement 
(Third) Tentative Draft No. 2, the conventional rule regarding 
a seller's informational obligation to remote-often work- 
place-users continues. In the Reporters' words: 
There is no general rule as to whether one supplying a 
product for the use of others through an intermediary has 
a duty to warn the ultimate product user directly or may 
rely on the intermediary to relay warnings. The standard is 
one of reasonableness in the circumstances. Among the 
factors to be considered are the gravity of the risks posed by 
the product, the likelihood that the intermediary will convey 
the information to the ultimate user, and the feasibility and 
effectiveness of giving a warning directly to the user.75 
The draft Restatement's preservation of the so-called "open and 
obvious" rule supports the proposal that a duty to warn does not 
attach to naturally occurring raw matefials. As the Reporters 
state: "In general, no duty exists to warn or instruct regarding 
risks and risk avoidance measures that should be obvious to, or 
generally known by, foreseeable product users. . . . Warning of 
an obvious or generally known risk in most instances will not 
provide an effective additional measure of safety."76 Persons who 
buy the materials know of the risks, and they are aware of the 
relative conductivity of copper, the brittleness of iron, or the 
weighfload bearing qualities of aluminum. 
B. The Reporters and Raw Materials 
The Reporters' commentary provides support for practical and 
theoretical contentions that strict products liability is confined 
to manufactured, finished products. The Introductory Note to the 
Restatement (Third) Tentative Draft No. 2 signals a conforming 
interpretation in promising that "Topic 1 consists of seven 
sections and covers the general subject of product defect for the 
vast majority of manufactured products."77 Read in its totality, 
the Reporters' comment to section 1 bolsters that conclusion. 
75. Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 1, 2 cmt. h. 
76. Id. 8 2 cmt. i. 
77. Id. at xxvii (emphasis added). 
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Although the Reporters recognize that "[mlost courts treat raw 
materials as products for the purposes of strict products liability 
in tort, provided that the injury resulted from an identifiable 
defect in the ra~,material," '~ they make this comment: 
Raw Materials. Product components include raw materials. 
. . . Thus, when raw materials are contaminated or other- 
wise defective . . . the seller of the raw materials is subject 
to  liability for harm caused by such defects. . . . A basic raw 
material such as sand, gravel, or kerosine cannot be defec- 
tively designed. If there is an inappropriate decision in the 
use of such materials, the failing is not attributable to the 
supplier of the raw materials, but rather to the fabricator 
that put them to use. The manufacturer of the integrated 
product has a significant comparative advantage regarding 
selection of materials to be used. Raw-materials sellers are 
accordingly not subject to liability for harm caused by 
, defective design of the end-product. The same considerations 
apply to  failure-to-warn claims against sellers of raw materi- 
als. To impose a duty to warn would require the seller to 
develop expertise regarding a multitude of different end- 
products and to investigate the actual use of raw materials 
by manufacturers over whom the supplier has no control.79 
In an illustration to  section 10 of the Restatement (Third) 
Tentative Draft No. 3 the Reporters hypothesize: 
LMN Sand Co. sells sand in bulk. ABC Construction Co. 
purchases sand to use in mixing cement. LMN is aware that 
the improper. mixture of its sand with other ingredients can 
cause cement containing the sand to crack. ABC utilizes 
LMN's sand to form a supporting column in a building. As 
a result of improper mixture the cement column cracks and 
gives way during a mild earthquake and causes injury to the 
building's occupants. LMN is not liable to the injured occu- 
pants. The sand sold by LMN is not defective in itself. . . . 
LMN has no duty to warn ABC about improperly mixing 
sand for use in cement. LMN does not participate in ABC's 
design of the cement and is not subject to liability for harm 
caused by the sand as integrated into the cement . . . . 80 
78. Id. 9 4 reporter's note cmt. b, at 148 (emphasis added). 
79. Tentative Draft No. 3, supra note 2, 9 10 cmt. c. 
80. Id. 9 10 cmt. c, illus. 6. 
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The rationale of this illustration is that liability attaches only 
where the "raw material" supplier has engaged in conduct that 
went beyond the normal activity of a raw material supplier, i.e., 
has participated in the design of the cement. The illustration 
lends support for a "no duty" rule for suppliers of merchantable 
naturally occurring raw materials. 
IV. MODERN RATIONALES FOR THE NATURALLY OCCURRING 
RAW MATERIAL NO DUTY RULE 
The question remains: Can a no duty rule for naturally 
occurring raw materials be harmonized with the goals of modern 
products liability law? While there are expressions without 
number of what these goals are, one effective expression was 
made by the California Supreme Court in Brown v. Superior 
In that decision, the California court, the founding court 
of modern strict products liabilit~,'~ identified the "fundamental 
reasons" for the application of modern products liability: "to 
deter manufacturers from marketing products that are unsafe, 
and to spread the cost of injury from the plaintiff to  the consum- 
ing public, which will pay a higher price for the product to 
reflect the increased expense of insurance to the manufacturer 
resulting from its greater exposure to liability."83 
Consistent with the language of Brown, legal commentators 
have developed rationales of "deterren~e"~~ and "efficien~y"'~ as 
important, although not exclusive, rationales for modern 
81. 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988). 
82. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962); see also 
supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text. 
83. Brown, 751 P.2d at 478. 
84. See M. Stuart Madden, The Vital Common Law: Its Role in a Statutory Age, 18 
U .  ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 555,584-85 (1996) (quoting various commentators); see also 
O.W. HoLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 144 (1881) ("The true explanation of the reference 
of liability to a moral standard . . . [is] that it is to give a man a fair chance to avoid 
doing the harm before he is held responsible for it."). 
85. See Guido Calabresi & A, Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, 
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1096-97 (1972) 
(suggesting that in "particular contexts like accidents or pollution [costs should be 
placed] on the party or activity which can most cheaply avoid them"). The Calabresi and 
Melamed approach influenced the Ninth Circuit in Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 
558 (9th Cir. 19741, an oil pollution caee. The court stated: "In determining whether the 
cost of an accident should be borne by the injured party or be shifted, in whole or in 
part, this [efficiency] approach requires the court to fix the identity of the party who can 
avoid the costs most cheaply." Id. at  569. 
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products liability. Even assuming that each of these tort ratio- 
nales enjoy a robust following today, a Restatement (Third) "no 
duty" rule would represent sound policy. If those who mined 
copper or lead or fabricated steel were strictly liable for harms 
caused by end-use products, insurance would be either unavail- 
able or enormously costly. Those saddled with the task of 
actuarially determining a proper rate would be faced with "open 
skies" liability because they would not know what products 
would eventually be made. Delineating a rational starting point 
for or cessation of potential liability would be impossible. By way 
of contrast, an insurer for the end-use product producer can look 
a t  and evaluate based on history and rational projections 
insurance risks of end-use products. Information on liability 
costs, past and projected, is crucial to carriers seeking to make 
coverage decisions and to set premiums. This information is 
available to the manufacturer of the end product, while i t  is 
normally unavailable to the supplier of raw materials potentially 
suited to a large number of potential end uses. Thus the raw 
materials manufacturer, if subject to potential liability for 
harms caused by products in which the material ultimately was 
an ingredient, could never procure liability insurance in an 
informed and cost effective way. In terms of efficiency, insurance 
becomes less expensive, and the raw materials supplier and the 
end use manufacturer avoid duplicating insurance coverage. It 
is seen that the risk distribution rationale mentioned in B r ~ w n * ~  
belies the imposition of products liability on suppliers of raw 
materials. 
The tort goal of deterrence is in no way compromised by 
application of a "no duty" rule to mere suppliers of merchant- 
able raw materials. A residual duty of reasonableness exists in 
the supplier's duty to supply what has been ordered. If a 
standard grade of copper is ordered and what is supplied is 
contaminated or a different grade and an injury results, the 
raw material supplier should be subject to liability. Likewise, 
if a raw material supplier goes beyond its traditional role and 
actively participates in the manufacturing process, its conduct 
should be judged on the basis of a reasonableness standard. 
Both of the aforementioned duties provide the raw materials 
supplier with an incentive to conduct its business consistent 
with a standard of reasonableness, and to avoid harmful 
behavior. 
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But deterrence only works if behavior exists that can be 
encouraged or prevented." Case law ranging from the most 
inchoate early rules to the most modern analyses have sug- 
gested that the manufacturer of the product, and not the raw 
material supplier, is in the best position to prevent an accident 
or injury. First, the manufacturer is a knowledgeable purchas- 
er, usually industrial, and is aware of the problems that a raw 
material can cause. Second, the manufacturer alone knows 
about its products, as well as who is likely to use them. The 
manufacturer is in the appropriate position to formulate warn- 
ings and to design its product so as to prevent injury. If i t  is 
impossible to prevent some risks, the draft Restatement requires 
manufacturers to warn about them, unless they involve hazards 
that everybody knows about." 
Deterrence works best when i t  is selective and focused. This 
essential products liability rationale supports limiting the 
obligations of suppliers of raw materials to what they are 
equipped and motivated to do best, and places responsibility for 
product risks finally and clearly upon the manufacturers of the 
product that caused the harm. 
Criticisms of the proposed Restatement (Third) provisions 
pertaining to liability of suppliers of raw materials have ranged 
from those who say it extends too far to others claiming that i t  
does not go far enough to limit liability. Professor Mark 
McLaughlin Hager appears to criticize any rule that would limit 
duty to reasonably foreseeable dangers,89 and states, "There 
should be no defense of unforeseeable use if the harm in 
question would also arise from foreseeable use."g0 
In contrast, Edward M. Mansfield, a practitioner who has 
studied this particular area of law, observes that even "if a 
87. See HOLMES, supra note 84, at  144. The goal of deterrence has seemingly been 
tort law's perpetual and faithful companion. As early as 1890 an academic author wrote 
of the goals of the negligence action in these words: T h e  really important matter is to 
adjust the dispute between the parties by a rule of conduct which shall do justice if 
possible in the particular case, but which shall also be suitable to the needs of the 
community, and tend to prevent like accidents from happening in future." William 
Schofield, Davies v. M ~ M :  Theory ofContributory Negligence, 3 HARV. L. REV. 263,269 
(1890). 
88. See Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 1, $ 2 cmt. i ("In general, no duty exists 
to warn or instruct regarding risks or risk avoidance measures that should be obvious 
to, or generally known by, foreseeable product users."). 
89. See Mark McLaughlin Hager, Don't Say I Didn't Warn You (Even Though I 
Didn't): Why the Pro-Defendant Consensus on Warning Law is Wrong, 61 TENN. L. REV. 
1125, 1134-49 (1994). 
90. Id. a t  1149. 
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multi-purpose raw material . . . is hazardous only as used in a 
particular type of finished product, legal responsibility rests 
with the finished product manufacturer and not with the raw 
material . . . supplier."'' He believes the draft Restatement 
would be improved if "existing legal protections for multi-use 
raw material and component suppliers" were "expressly re- 
tained" in the proposed Restatement (Third)." 
Another expert on raw material liability law, Charles E. 
Erway, 111, has supported this view.93 He writes that no liability 
should attach to the supplier of non-defective raw materials 
with a range of end uses over which the initial supplier has no 
control.94 In particular, Erway focuses on the temporomandibu- 
lar joint disorder (TMJ) litigation involving DuPont polymers, 
sold under the trade name ~eflon@.'~ He reports that in ten of 
the twelve reportedTMJ decisions, DuPont was dismissed from 
the suit on the basis, a t  least in part, that Teflona is not haz- 
a r d ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~  In one suit summary judgment was granted in part 
and denied in part because the court found- no factual issue 
existed as to whether DuPont satisfied the "bulk supplier" 
defense.'" In the last of the twelve reported. suits, the Eighth 
Circuit affirmed a jury verdict for DuPont.'* 
Likewise, in ten cases against raw material suppliers involv- 
ing toxic, flammable, or otherwise hazardous substances, 
Erway's research revealed that six courts dismissed all claims:' 
one reversed summary judgment on the basis of a potential 
issue of fact,"' one affirmed a trial court denying manufacturer's 
91. Mansfield, supra note 42, at  222. 
92. Id. 
93. See Erway, supra note 13, at  270. 
94. See id. 
95. See generally id. a t  275-79. 
96. See, e.g., Klem v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 19 F.3d 997, 1001 (5th Cir. 
1994); Lamontague v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., Inc.', 834 F. Supp. 576, 591-92 
(D. Conn. 1993), affd, 41 F.3d 846 (2d Cir. 1994); Nowak v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours 
& Co., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 1334, 133f3-37 (W.D. Mich. 1993); Bond v. E.I. DuPont de 
Nemours & Co., 868 P.2d 1114,1118-19 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993); Longo v. E.I. DuPont de 
Nemours & Co., 632 So. 2d 1193, 1196-97 (La. Ct. App. 1994). 
97. See Forest v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 791 F. Supp. 1460, 1470-71 (D. 
Nev. 1992). 
98. See Rynders v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 21 F.3d 835, 843 (8th Cir. 
1994). 
99. See, e.g., Walker v. Stauffer Chem. Corp., 96 Cal. Rptr. 803,804 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1971) (sulfuric acid); Jackson v. Reliable Paste & Chem. Co., 483 N.E.2d 939, 944 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1985) (methanol); see also Erway, supra note 13, a t  270-71 & n.5. 
100. See Bryant v. Technical Research Co., 654 F.2d 1337, 1349 (9th Cir. 1981) 
(methyl butyl ketone). 
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motion for a new trial as to the liability of raw material suppli- 
er,''' and one reversed a plaintiffs verdict.lo2 Erway concludes: 
The decisions on point generally have indicated that seeking 
to impose . . . liability [upon ingredient suppliers] is ill 
founded, because the duty to properly design, manufacture, 
and test a product, and in turn to provide appropriate 
warnings, are responsibilities of the product manufactur- 
er. . . . The manufacturer is almost invariably knowledgeable 
regarding its product and is the only one in a position to 
provide appropriate product ~arnings. ' '~  
Another important cost to society of open-ended liability rules 
regarding suppliers of raw materials is huge litigation costs. 
Although the raw material supplier wins its cases, the costs of 
successfully defending invariably are passed along to the con- 
sumer. But the DuPont TMJ implant cases illustrate an even 
greater cost to society: The raw material supplier might decide 
not to sell its products to manufacturers of medical devices. This 
in turn means that people who need the devices will not have 
them or that the manufacturers of such devices will have to turn 
to raw material suppliers who have no place of business in the 
United States. Foreign suppliers can unreasonably raise prices 
and also may supply raw materials that are not of merchantable 
quality. 
A virtual consensus of scholarly and decisional deliberation 
concludes that sellers of raw materials are not circumstanced 
as to make them properly liable in products liability claims. The 
Reporters to the new Restatement agree, stating sellers of raw 
materials "are not subject to liability for harm caused by defec- 
tive design of the end-product. The same considerations apply 
101. See Hill v. Wilmington Chem. Corp., 156 N.W.2d 898, 902 (Minn. 1968) 
(solvent). 
102. See Shell Oil Co. v. Harrison, 425 So. 2d 67, 70 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (soil 
fumigant). In Erway's research, the tenth ruling involved a successful asbestos class 
action. See Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. Tex. 1990). 
103. Erway, supra note 13, a t  297. Subsequent to the publication of the Erway 
article, DuPont has been exonerated in 42 additional suits. See, e.g., Parker v. E.I. 
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 909 P.2d 1 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995); Hoyt v. Vitek, Inc., 894 
P.2d 1225 (Or. Ct. App. 1995); Westphal v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 531 N.W.2d 
386 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995); see also Memorandum from Ross F. Schmucki, Senior Counsel, 
E.I. DuPont de Nemoum & Co., TMJ Litigation Status (Aug. 2, 1996) (on file with the 
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). 
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to failure-to-warn claims against sellers of raw materials. ,9104 
Mansfield, in turn, identifies a "largely unarticulated rule that 
bars many product liability claims against multi-purpose raw 
n105 material . . . suppliers. In sum, Erway also identifies "a 
strong case for the nonliability of ingredient suppliers in litiga- 
tion regarding end products. n106 
Why is a categorical or de jure immunity for merchantable, 
naturally occurring raw materials preferable to a more com- 
plicated de facto immunity? Consider this hypothetical: In the 
jurisdiction of one state, the rule of evidence states that only 
competent witnesses shall testify. No corollary that children 
beneath a certain age, such as the age of three years, shall be 
presumptively incompetent to testify exists. Over a period of 
fifty years, hundreds of children less than three years in age are 
proffered as potential witnesses. They are examined prelim- 
inarily by the court, and none is permitted to testify. Some are 
excluded because they are unable to convince the court that they 
know the difference between truth and untruth, and others 
because they have insufficient narrative skills, or because they 
have insufficient cognitive skills, to be competent witnesses. 
Is this country's administration of justice best served by 
having a single pole star rule (only competent witnesses shall 
testify) followed by individualized de facto determinations of 
competence even for classes of potential witnesses who are 
invariably found unsuited to testify? Or would the justice system 
be better served by making an experience-based de jure rule 
that children under the age of three are conclusively presumed 
to be incompetent to testify? Raw materials suppliers are not 
three-year-olds, but the rationale for limiting their duty is as 
strong as it is for precluding young children from wasting the 
time of our legal system by placing them on the witness stand. 
This Article has attempted to show that in the setting of 
design obligations or warning duties for naturally occurring raw 
materials, the Reporters' comments should state that the 
104. Tentative Draft No. 3, supra note 2, 8 10 cmt. c. 
105. Mansfield, supra note 42, at 222. 
106. Erway, supm note 13, at 297. 
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ordinary rules of products liability are presumptively inappli- 
cable. Accordingly, the new draR Restatement should be clear in 
this regard and provide language to this effect: 
Products liability design and warning duties should not 
ordinarily apply to bulk sales of merchantable, naturally 
occurring raw materials, or the ordinary alloys of such 
raw materials, absent a showing of a defect in the 
product itself that poses an unreasonable risk of person- 
al physical injury. The rationale for precluding applica- 
tion of products liability to such materials is that in 
their unchanged form, naturally occurring raw materials 
are not "products" as to which the prevailing design and 
warnings obligations may be efficiently or practically 
applied. 
A rule characterizing producers of non-defective naturally 
occurring raw materials as excluded from potential products 
liability would focus like a laser beam on design and warning 
responsibilities upon the parties truly able to discharge those 
duties-the manufacturers of the end-use products. The rule 
would also be in harmony with three principal goals of products 
liability law: deterrence, risk spreading, and efficiency. The 
benefits to society are the elimination of needless litigation costs 
and the assurance that non-defective raw materials are avail- 
able for desirable products. 
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